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We present a comprehensive model of household economic decision covering both fully 
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1 Introduction
Most economic models of household behavior, both theoretical and empirical,
have assumed that households act cooperatively, implying that binding marriage
agreements under full information and perfect communication are feasible at no
(or low) transaction costs. This cooperative approach includes the traditional,
but empirically contested, "unitary models" viewing the household as a single
decision unit, e.g. Samuelsons consensus model and Beckers altruist model. It
also includes models based on axiomatic bargaining theory, as well as the more
recent "collective" models, exploring the restrictions on observable household
behavior implied by the assumption of Pareto e¢ ciency without explicitly re-
ferring to some decision making process (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, Browning and
Chiappori, 1998).
However, some theoretical models have formalised the possibility for a house-
hold agreement to be non-cooperative and in particular to be an equilibrium in
a game of voluntary contributions to public goods. In these models (e.g. Ulph,
1988, Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, Chen and Woolley, 2001), the noncooperative
equilibrium is introduced as the threat (or disagreement) point of a bargain-
ing model1 and, under some conditions, as a "separate spheres" equilibrium
where each spouse is responsible for a distinct set of goods and services within
the household, the partition being "dened in terms of traditional gender roles
and gender roles expectations" (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, p.1007).2 When
binding agreements are impossible or too costly to enforce, the non-cooperative
agreement may even become the acceptable default option in a continuing re-
lationship. In this context, the concept of noncooperative equilibrium for the
household has been further analysed by Lechene and Preston (2005, 2011) and
by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010) who conrm previous results by
1This is di¤erent from earlier models where the disagreement point was taken to be divorce
(Manser and Brown, 1980, and McElroy and Horney, 1981).
2 Indeed, "specialization in the provision of such goods reduces the need for complex pat-
terns of coordination, and traditional gender roles serve as a focal point for tacit division of
responsibilities" (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, p.993).
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showing that there are generically only two possible types of noncooperative
equilibria, "separate spheres" and "separate spheres up to one public good",
the latter meaning that spouses do not contribute jointly to more than one
public good.
Such a conclusion, though, seems to be too clearcut to give account of the
variety of household arrangements. In reality, the denition, and hence the divi-
sion, of tasks and responsibilities to provide some goods and services within the
household is ambiguous and may vary over husband-wife pairs. "Child care"
or "housekeeping" might be divided in many sub-tasks that can be di¤erently
shared. The perfect partition according to gender roles is a limit case that does
not hold for most households in most contemporary societies. Also, arrange-
ments within the household might change along life path (with the number of
children, the income level, the geographical location, etc.). Good intentions
erode with time and a genuine cooperative agreement might gradually evolve
towards some more traditional division of responsibilities. The way in which
the household organizes its nances, in particular whether each spouse has its
own account and/or shares some joint account, as well as the type of marriage
contract may inuence this evolution.3 As emphasized by Lechene and Preston
(2005): "neither the assumption of fully e¢ cient cooperation nor of complete
absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely accurate description of typical
household spending behaviour and analysis of such extreme cases can be seen
as a rst step towards understanding of a more adequate model" (p. 19).
Our objective is to follow this route and develop a comprehensive model,
that includes the cooperative and the noncooperative cases at the extremes, but
allows for a continuum of intermediate "semi-cooperative" cases. This compre-
hensive model is based on a "mechanism design" reformulation of the Lindahl
equilibrium for Nash-implementation (see Hurwicz, 1979, and Walker, 1981)
3Household money management systems have been extensively studied both empirically,
essentially in the sociological literature (e.g. Pahl, 2008; see also the two surveys of the
International Social Survey Programme of 1994 and 2002, analyzing representative samples
of 38 countries) and experimentally (for recent studies see Ashraf, 2009, and Schaner, 2010).
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and its extension to semi-cooperation. In order to implement the household
collective objectives while preserving budgetary autonomy and feasibility, the
proposed mechanism (formulated for simplicity in terms of a two-person house-
hold) is dened by non-manipulable personalized pricing rules for the public
goods and by individual budget constraints preserving some autonomy to each
spouse. Given this mechanism, the spouses choose strategically their individual
contributions to the various public goods as well as their desired consumption of
all goods. The solution of this game will be called a household (noncooperative)
equilibrium.
In addition, testable (local) restrictions of household demand will be investi-
gated, such as those studied under the assumption of e¢ ciency by Browning and
Chiappori (1998), relying on the decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix as
the sum of a matrix with the Slutsky properties and a "deviation matrix" (of
rank equal to 1 for a two-person household). Lechene and Preston (2011) derive
a similar test for the fully non-cooperative model showing that the deviation
matrix has generally a larger rank than in the collective model, increasing with
the number of public goods. Our paper gives a derivation of the pseudo-Slutsky
matrix allowing to separate di¤erent kinds of e¤ects, each e¤ect increasing the
maximum possible rank of the deviation matrix. The implementation of such
tests becomes more and more demanding in terms of the required number of
goods. As we will see, however, the non-cooperative and the semi-cooperative
models are distinguishable as soon as there is joint contribution to more than
one public good.
In Section 2, we present a two-person household semi-cooperative decision
model, dening the non-manipulable mechanism as well as two related ap-
proaches to the concept of "household equilibrium" characterized, either en-
dogenously or exogenously, by the degrees of autonomy of each spouse for each
public good. We illustrate via an example the implications of varying the de-
grees of autonomy. In Section 3, we examine the generic local properties of the
household equilibrium and derive the pseudo-Slutsky matrix of the household
demand, then discussing the testability of the various models. We conclude in
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Section 4.
2 The household decision model
We study a two-adult household, consuming goods that are recognized by both
spouses as being either private or public (within the household). Denote by A
(the wife) and B (the husband) the two household members, and let
 
qA; qB
 2
R2n+ be the vector of consumption by the two members of the n private goods
and Q 2 Rm+ the consumption vector of the m public goods. The preferences
of each spouse J (J = A;B) are represented by a utility function UJ
 
qJ ; Q

,
which is dened on Rn+m+ , increasing and strongly quasi-concave. Each spouse
J is supposed to receive an initial income Y J  0, the total household income
being Y = Y A + Y B > 0. Also assumed is an agreed upon mechanism which
determines the game played by the household when deciding on its total con-
sumption given the vector of private good prices p 2 Rn++ and the vector of
public good prices P 2 Rm++. The rst private good, assumed to be desired in
any household environment, is taken as numéraire (p1 = 1).
2.1 The Lindahl mechanism for cooperative household de-
cisions
We start from the concept of Lindahl equilibrium, which is the best-known
"decentralized" allocation mechanism4 to allocate e¢ ciently the cost of public
goods within a group. The Lindahl scheme consists in supposing that there
exists a pair of personalized (Lindahl) prices
 
PA; PB
 2 R2m+ , satisfying PA +
PB = P , which are posted within the household. However, the version we give
of the concept is not the standard one. It is a "mechanism design" version à la
Hurwicz (1979) andWalker (1981). We suppose that there is enough cooperation
so that the two spouses can agree on some mechanism to share the expenses
4 Introduced by Lindahl (1919) and popularized by Samuelson (1954). Cherchye, De Rock
and Vermeulen (2007) also use Lindahl prices to analyze household decisions.
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for nancing the public goods on the basis of voluntary contributions

gJk
	
and
desired aggregate quantities

QJk
	
for each spouse J and each public good k.
This mechanism consists in posting personalized pricing rules
 bPA; bPB for
the public goods and in specifying individual budget constraints. As in Walker
(1981), these personalized pricing rules have to be non-manipulable. In the
present collective decision problem involving a husband-wife pair, we cannot
use the personalized pricing rules proposed by Walker since they require at
least three agents. But the following will do:
bP Jk  g Jk ; Q Jk ; Pk  Q Jk   g JkQ Jk Pk, for J = A;B and any public good k.
(1)
Given this mechanism a game is dened where the payo¤s are the spousesutility
functions. The strategies of each spouse J are the quantities
 
qJ ; gJ ; QJ
 2
Rn+2m+ , denoting respectively the quantities of private goods, the voluntary
contributions and the desired aggregate quantities for the various public goods.
For each spouse J , these strategies have to respect two constraints. First there
is a budget constraint on the spouses expenses on private goods (at the market
prices p) and on public goods (at the personalized prices P J). Second there is
a feasibility constraint, whereby the desired quantities QJ should be equal to
the aggregate contributions gJk + g
 J
k . A Lindahl equilibrium for the household
is then dened as the following Nash equilibrium of the game dened by the
personalized pricing rules
 bPA; bPB:
Denition 1 A vector
 
qA; gA; QA; qB ; gB ; QB ;
 2 R2n+4m+ is a Lindahl (house-
hold) equilibrium if the vector
 
qJ ; gJ ; QJ

solves, for each J = A;B, the pro-
gram
max
(eqJ ;egJ ; eQJ)2Rn+2m+ U
J
eqJ ; eQJ (2)
s.t. peqJ + Q Jk   g Jk
Q Jk
Pk eQJk  Y J
and eQJ = egJ + g J .
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Observe that the Lindahl prices are taken as given by each spouse J because
of the Nash assumption of taking as given the equilibrium strategies of spouse
 J . Also, we have QA = gA + gB = QB at equilibrium, implying
P Jk = bP Jk  g Jk ; Q Jk ; Pk = gJkgJk + g Jk Pk, for J = A;B and any public good k.
(3)
This property (which implies that PAk + P
B
k = Pk for every k) ensures the
equivalence of this household equilibrium to the standard denition of a Lin-
dahl equilibrium where individualized contributions gJk are not introduced, but
instead each individual chooses a desired total consumption QJk of public good
k. At a Lindahl (household) equilibrium, gAk and g
B
k are either both positive or
both nil for any public good k.5
For the sake of later comparisons, the rst order conditions for a Lindahl
household equilibrium (for J = A;B) can be easily derived (we can eliminate
QJ since QJ = gJ + g J ):
1
@q1U
J (qJ ; gJ + g J)
@qU
J
 
qJ ; gJ + g J
  p, (4)
1
@q1U
J (qJ ; gJ + g J)
@QU
J
 
qJ ; gJ + g J
  J  qJ ; gJ + g J  P J ,
pqJ + P J
 
gJ + g J

= Y J ,
with P Jk =
gJk
gJk + g
 J
k
Pk, for every public good k,
and an inequality becoming an equality for any private good i s.t. qJi > 0 or
any public good k s.t. QJk > 0. These rst order conditions entail the Bowen-
Lindahl-Samuelson conditions for any interior Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
5The case where spouse J would prefer to diminish the consumption of public good k at
a Lindahl (household) equilibrium, but cannot because of a binding non-negative constraint
on gJk , is eliminated. Indeed, g
J
k = 0 and g
 J
k > 0 imply P
J
k = 0, and hence a contradiction
since, with PJk = 0, g
J
k = 0 could not be optimal since U
J
 
qJ ; QJ

is increasing in QJk .
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2.2 Taking into account individual autonomy
From the point of view of Nash implementation, the mechanism we have dened
to implement the Lindahl equilibrium has good properties, since it ensures both
non-manipulability of the personalized pricing rules and Pareto e¢ ciency. Also,
at equilibrium, we have P JQJ = PgJ , hence pqJ + PgJ = Y J for each spouse
J , implying that the chosen contributions are feasible for the household budget:
they could actually be bought autonomously by each spouse instead of being
paid by the Lindahl transfers to the common purse. However this autonomous
feasibility might not hold out of equilibrium where aggregate contributions could
be unfeasible even for the household total budget.
To always ensure such autonomous feasibility (and hence aggregate bud-
getary feasibility), we modify our Lindahl mechanism by introducing individual
autonomy in each budget constraint, while keeping the same personalized pric-
ing rules
 bPA; bPB. Each spouse J , when choosing a contribution gJk to any
desired public consumption QJk should keep the budgetary freedom either to pay
the Lindahl tax bP Jk QJk to the common purse or to spend instead PkgJk directly
in the market. In other words, any deviation by spouse J should not only be
autonomously feasible and comply with the obligation to take the agreed upon
share of the household expenditure on each public good k (i.e. the share re-
sulting from the personalized pricing rule of the accepted mechanism), it should
in addition preserve the individual autonomy for the partner (who can always
go and buy gJk in the market).
6 Of course, as for the Lindahl equilibrium, the
equality of the "desired" quantities of public goods to aggregate contributions
have to hold for both spouses only at equilibrium.
The non-cooperative equilibrium of the corresponding modied game, called
a household equilibrium, still based on the personalized pricing rules
 bPA; bPB,
can be dened as follows:
6Some money management systems could facilitate this type of individual autonomy. Each
spouse having its own bank account and the household having one joint account is such a
system (called partial pool by Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins, 2006). Of course this is
neither necessary nor su¢ cient to ensure individual autonomy.
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Denition 2 A vector
 
qA; gA; QA; qB ; gB ; QB
 2 R2n+4m+ is a household equi-
librium if, for J = A;B, the strategy
 
qJ ; gJ ; QJ

solves the program:
max
(eqJ ;egJ ; eQJ)2Rn+2m+ U
J
eqJ ; eQJ (5)
s.t. peqJ + mX
k=1
max
(
Q Jk   g Jk
Q Jk
Pk eQJk ; PkegJk
)
 Y J ,
and eQJ = egJ + g J . (6)
This modication of the mechanism has considerable consequences. First, as
will be shown in the following, there is now a continuum of household equilibria
(that can be meaningfully parameterized), as opposed to the generic niteness
of the Lindahl equilibria. Second, it will follow that the set of equilibria includes
the Lindahl equilibria at one extreme (the only e¢ cient ones) and, at the other
extreme, the noncooperative equilibria of the "game with voluntary contributions
to public goods" (analyzed for household behavior by Lundberg and Pollak, 1993,
Lechene and Preston, 2005, 2011, and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2010).
In this game, each spouse J chooses a strategy
 
qJ ; gJ
 2 Rn+m+ (qJ denoting
J 0s private consumptions and gJ his/her contributions to public goods) in order
to solve the programme:
max
(qJ ;gJ )2Rn+m+
UJ
 
qJ ; gJ + g J

(7)
s.t. pqJ + PgJ  Y J .
A Nash equilibrium of this game can be characterized by the rst order condi-
tions (for J = A;B):
1
@q1U
J (qJ ; gJ + g J)
@qU
J
 
qJ ; gA + gB
  p (8)
J
 
qJ ; gA + gB
  P
pqJ + PgJ = Y J ,
with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJi > 0 or any public good k s.t.
gJk > 0.
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2.3 Characterization of a household equilibrium
The concept of household equilibrium can be alternatively formulated. In the
previous denition of a household equilibrium, each spouse J faces a nonsmooth
optimization program (because of the max function in the budget constraint).
This program can be replaced by an equivalent smooth program with 2m budget
constraints indexed by J 2 J  f0; 1gm:
peqJ + mX
k=1
 
JkPkegJk + 1  Jk Q Jk   g Jk
Q Jk
Pk eQJk
!
 Y J . (9)
Each J 2 J describes a conguration specifying the public goods for which
spouse J goes to the market (Jk = 1) and those for which J accepts to contribute
to the common purse (Jk = 0). All such congurations have to be budgetary
feasible for spouse J . We then have the following result.
Lemma 1 A household equilibrium is characterized by the following system of
inequalities and equalities for J = A;B:
1
@q1U
J (qJ ; gJ + g J)
@qU
J
 
qJ ; gJ + g J
  p (10)
and, for all k and some Jk 2 [0; 1],
1
@q1U
J (qJ ; gJ + g J)
@QkU
J
 
qJ ; gJ + g J
  Jk  qJ ; gJ + g J
 JkPk +

1  Jk

P Jk , with P
J
k =
gJk
gJk + g
 J
k
Pk, (11)
pqJ +
mX
k=1

JkPkg
J
k +

1  Jk

P Jk
 
gJk + g
 J
k

= Y J ,
an inequality becoming an equality for any private good i s.t. qJi > 0 or any
public good k s.t. QJk > 0.
Proof. Suppose that, in the denition of a household equilibrium, we replace
the budget constraint in program (5) by the set of constraints (9). The program
of each spouse consists then in maximizing a strongly quasi-concave utility func-
tion under linear constraints. Taking rst order conditions we immediately get
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the wanted inequalities for the private goods and, for any public good k and
spouse J , and for some vector of Lagrange multipliers JJ 2 R2
m
+ ,
1
@q1U
J (qJ ; gJ + g J)
@QkU
J
 
qJ ; gJ + g J

 1X
J2J
JJ
0B@ X
J2fJ :Jk=1g
JJPk +
X
bJ2nJ :bJk=0o
JbJ bP Jk  g Jk ; Q Jk ; Pk
1CA
 JkPk +

1  Jk

P Jk (with 
J
k the normalized Lagrange multiplier),
so that we get the wanted inequality for public good k using the fact thatbP Jk  g Jk ; Q Jk ; Pk = P Jk at equilbrium. Finally, because P Jk  gJk + g Jk  =
Pkg
J
k for every k, we get the equality
pqJ +
mX
k=1

JkPkg
J
k +

1  Jk

P Jk
 
gJk + g
 J
k

= Y J ,
and the result follows.
Comparing the characterization of a household equilibrium with the one of
a Lindahl equilibrium, we immediately see that the two coincide for Jk = 0,
for all k and J = A;B. Similarly, the household equilibrium coincides with the
Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary contributions to public goods for
Jk = 1, for all k and J = A;B. But there are many such equilibria, at least one
for each  =

A; B

2 [0; 1]2m, as it will be shown in the next Subsection.
Considering the "smooth" denition of a household equilibrium with 2m budget
constraints (9) for J = A;B, we see that each Jk is the (normalized) sum of the
shadow prices associated with those Js budget constraints corresponding to an
autonomous purchase of public good k in the market (Jk = 1). Each 
J
k can
thus be interpreted as the price J would be ready to pay to relax anyone of the
constraints. In that sense Jk measures the degree of autonomy of spouse J with
respect to public good k. This interpretation is reinforced by the way the budget
constraint is written in the characterization of a household equilibrium given in
the lemma. The expenses of spouse J to nance its contribution to public
good k are divided into two parts, one autonomous, valued at market price
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Pk, the other collective, valued at the personalized price P Jk . This suggests an
alternative approach to the household game.
2.4 The game with given degrees of autonomy
In our analysis, up to now, the degrees of autonomy of both spouses are xed en-
dogenously, ex post, as characteristics of a specic equilibrium. We may however
invert the approach, and take the parameters as preliminarily and conventionally
xed, ex ante, within the household. Otherwise, we keep the same mechanism,
with the same strategies and the same payo¤s. This leads to the following de-
nition of equilibrium relative to xed degrees of autonomy

A; B

2 [0; 1]2m
and based on the personalized pricing rules
 bPA; bPB:
Denition 3 A vector
 
qA; gA; QA; qB ; gB ; QB
 2 R2n+4m+ is a household -
equilibrium with degrees of autonomy

A; B

2 [0; 1]2m if, for J = A;B, the
strategy
 
qJ ; gJ ; QJ

solves the program:
max
(eqJ ;egJ ; eQJ)2Rn+2m+ U
J
eqJ ; eQJ (12)
s.t. peqJ + mX
k=1
 
JkPkegJk + 1  Jk Q Jk   g Jk
Q Jk
Pk eQJk
!
 Y J ,
and eQJ = egJ + g J .
In this concept, the division in two parts of the expenses of each spouse on
each public good is made explicit through the budget constraint, according to
the pre-established degrees of autonomy for that public good. The following
proposition claries the relationship between the two concepts of household
equilibrium and of household -equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A vector
 
qA; gA; QA; qB ; gB ; QB
 2 R2n+4m+ with associated
normalized Lagrange multipliers  2 [0; 1]2m is a household equilibrium for
the personalized pricing rules
 bPA; bPB if and only if it is a household -
equilibrium. For each  2 [0; 1]2m, there is such an equilibrium. When Jk = 0
for any J and any k, this is a Lindahl equilibrium. When Jk = 1 for any J
12
and any k, it is a Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary contributions to
public goods.
Proof. In both cases, the program of each spouse consists in maximizing a
strongly quasi-concave utility function under linear constraints. Taking the
rst order conditions for a household -equilibrium with degrees of autonomy
A; B

, we see that they coincide with those for a household equilibrium
with associated normalized Lagrange multipliers

A; B

, as given by Lemma
1. These conditions also coincide with the rst order conditions for a Lindahl
(household) equilibrium, as given by (4), when Jk = 0 for any J and k, and
with the rst order conditions for a Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary
contributions to public goods, as given by (8), when Jk = 1 for any J and k.
As to existence of a household -equilibrium for every  2 [0; 1]2m, consider
this equilibrium as one of a generalized game as in Debreu (1952). The strategies 
qJ ; gJ ; QJ

of J are constrained to be in a compact, convex, non-empty set SJ
dened by 0  qJi  Y J=pi for i = 1; :::; n, and 0  gJk  QJk  Y=Pk for k =
1; :::;m. We further dene for each spouse J a choice correspondence associating
with each strategy
 
q J ; g J ; Q J
 2 S J , the subset of SJ satisfying QJ =
gJ + g J and
pqJ +
mX
k=1
 
JkPkg
J
k +

1  Jk

Pk
Q Jk   g Jk
Q Jk
 
gJk + g
 J
k
!  Y J .
This correspondence is continuous, and non-empty convex valued. Since the
payo¤ functions UJ are continuous and quasi-concave, Debreus (1952) social
equilibrium existence theorem applies.
Notice that, whenever it exists, a household -equilibrium with separate
spheres, namely with gAk g
B
k = 0 for all k, coincides with an equilibrium of the
game with voluntary contributions to public goods. Indeed, if g Jk = 0 whereas
gJk > 0, then P
 J
k = 0 and P
J
k = Pk. As a consequence, the planned unit
expenditure on public good k for a deviation by spouse J is JkPk+

1  Jk

Pk =
Pk, the same as in the game with voluntary contributions to public goods. As
to spouse  J , who decides not to contribute to public good k when the planned
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unit expenditure on this good is  Jk Pk, he/she would not want to deviate in the
game with voluntary contributions to public goods when the unit expenditure
is Pk  JkPk. This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let 0 < Jk  1 for any J and k. Suppose
 
qA; gA; QA; qB ; gB ; QB
 2
R2n+4m+ is a household -equilibrium such that gAk gBk = 0 for all k ( separate
spheres). Then
 
qA; gA; qB ; gB

is a Nash equilibrium of the game with volun-
tary contributions to public goods.
A last remark in this subsection concerns Pareto e¢ ciency. Take the rst
order conditions relative to the public good k for both spousesprograms, as
given by Lemma 1. For e¢ ciency, the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson condition re-
quires that the sum Ak + 
B
k of the two marginal willingnesses to pay be equal
to the corresponding market price Pk = PAk + P
B
k . This condition is generally
violated as soon as cooperation is less than full. Indeed, the sum of the two
marginal willingnesses to pay is equal, if both spouses contribute to public good
k, to Pk + 
A
k P
B
k + 
B
k P
A
k , larger than Pk outside the case 
A
k = 
B
k = 0, and
the more so the higher the degrees of autonomy of the two spouses. Also, if
a spouse, say the wife, contributes alone to public good k, Ak = Pk, so that
Pk < 
A
k + 
B
k , leading to a similar conclusion.
2.5 An example
In order to discuss the conditions leading to the regimes of separate spheres
and of joint contribution to one or more public goods, we shall refer to the
example used by Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (2010) in the context of full
non-cooperation. In this example, the spouses have Cobb-Douglas preferences
over one private and two public goods. We denote by x and z the private
consumptions of spouses A and B, respectively, and by X and Z the quantities
of the two public goods. The utility functions are given by:
UA (x;X;Z) = xXaZ and UB (z;X;Z) = zXbZ , (13)
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with positive parameter values a, , b and . The wife A is supposed to care
more about the rst public good, and the husband B about the second, so that
s  =a
=b
< 1, (14)
where the term on the LHS can be taken as the degree of symmetry of the
spousespreferences for the two public goods. We use the normalization
px = pz = PX = PZ = Y = 1, (15)
with an income distribution given by Y A =  and Y B = 1  . The degrees of
autonomy are assumed to be symmetric with respect to the two public goods,
so that they will be simply denoted A and B .
Browning, Chiappori & Lechene (2010) show the existence of three kinds
of regimes. Two kinds correspond to separate spheres, prevailing both for ex-
tremely unequal income distributions, where the spouse with the higher income
contributes alone to both public goods, and for relatively equal income distri-
butions, where each spouse contributes to her/his preferred public good. The
third kind appears in intermediate cases of income distribution and is charac-
terized by separate spheres up to one public good (and local income pooling):
the spouse with the higher income contributes to both public goods, while the
other spouse contributes solely to her/his preferred public good. A fourth kind
of regime, with both spouses contributing to both public goods, is generically
excluded under full non-cooperation, but not in the semi-cooperative case, as
we shall show.
 Consider the regime of separate spheres where both spouses contribute, A
to her preferred public good (X) and B to his (Z). Hence, PAZ = P
B
X = 0
and PAX = P
B
Z = 1. By the rst order conditions for public goods,
ax=X = A +

1  A

PAX = 1, x=Z < 
A +

1  A

PAZ = 
A,(16)
z=Z = B +

1  B

PBZ = 1, bz=X < 
B +

1  B

PBX = 
B .
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Using the equilibrium budget equations
x+X = , z + Z = 1  , (17)
we easily obtain the solution
x =

1 + a
, X =
a
1 + a
, z =
1  
1 + 
, Z =
 (1  )
1 + 
. (18)
This solution is constrained by the two rst order conditions on the non-
contributed goods, expressed as inequalities:


1 + 
1 + a

1   < 
A,
b
a
1 + a
1 + 
1  

< B . (19)
Clearly, one of these two conditions will be violated for small enough or
large enough values of , so that separate spheres with both spouses con-
tributing to public consumption can prevail only if the income distribution
between the two spouses is not too unequal. Also, by multiplying both
sides of the rst inequality by the corresponding sides of the second, we
obtain
0 < s < AB  1. (20)
Hence, existence of this regime requires a relatively high average degree of
autonomy of the two spouses, the higher the larger the degree of symmetry
of their preferences for the two public goods. The fully non-cooperative
case, where AB = 1, always satises this condition, provided there is no
full symmetry in the spousespreferences.
 Now consider the regime of joint contribution to both public goods, which
is generically excluded under full autonomy of the two spouses. By rst
order conditions, the marginal willingnesses-to-pay for the public goods
are:
ax=X = A +

1  A

PAX , x=Z = 
A +

1  A

PAZ , (21)
z=Z = B +

1  B

PBZ , bz=X = 
B +

1  B

PBX .
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Division of both sides of the second and third equations by the correspond-
ing sides of the rst and fourth, respectively, leads to
a

A  a

A +

1  A

PAZ
A +

1  A

PAX
=
X
Z
=
b

B +

1  B

PBZ
B +

1  B

PBX
 b

1
B
,
(22)
the two inequalities being easily checked to be true (by taking the extreme
values PAX = 1 and P
A
Z = 0). We thus obtain
0  AB  s < 1, (23)
an existence condition just opposite to the one we found for separate
spheres. For both spouses to contribute to both public goods their av-
erage degree of autonomy must be small enough, the smaller the more
asymmetric their preferences for the public goods.
Thus, for not too unequal income distributions, separate spheres appear as
a characteristic of high individual autonomy in household decisions. As the
spouses become less and less autonomous, the regime prevailing when their
incomes are not too di¤erent is rather the one where both contribute to both
public goods, which is the rule under full cooperation.
More generally, in order to represent the parameter congurations leading
to the di¤erent regimes, we take the same values as in Browning, Chiappori and
Lechene (2010), namely a = 5=3,  = 8=9, b = 15=32 and  = 1=2, leading
to a degree of symmetry equal to 0:5, and we stick now to equal degrees of
autonomy A = B = . This is given in Figure 1, with  and  varying from
0 to 1 along the horizontal and the vertical axes, respectively. Six di¤erent
regimes are possible: (I) where B is the only spouse to contribute to (both)
public goods, (II) where A contributes to her preferred public good and B still
contributes to both, (III) where each spouse specializes on his/her preferred
public good (separate spheres with both spouses contributing), (IV) and (V)
symmetric to (II) and (I) respectively (with inverted roles of A and B), and
(VI) where both spouses contribute to both public goods.
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I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Figure 1: Regime switching values of  as  varies
As already mentioned, we see that the regime (III) of separate spheres exists
only for a su¢ ciently high degree of autonomy (higher than the square root
of the degree of symmetry
p
1=2 = 0:707 ), and for relatively equal income
shares. The corresponding regime (VI) for a lower degree of autonomy is the
one where both spouses contribute to both public goods, allowing for more
and more income disparities as we approach full cooperation. By contrast, the
regimes (I) and (V) of exclusive contribution to public spending by the richer
spouse are compatible with a lower and lower amplitude in income distribution
as we approach full non-cooperation.
3 Local analysis of household -equilibria
We shall now successively examine the local properties of the system of equations
characterizing a household -equilibrium (extending the analysis in Browning,
Chiappori and Lechene, 2010), and the local properties of the associated house-
hold demand function (extending the analysis in Browning and Chiappori, 1998,
and Lechene and Preston, 2010).
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3.1 Local determinacy
For an environment (p; P; Y ) and an income distribution
 
Y A; Y B

, take a
household -equilibrium
 
qA; gA; QA; qB ; gB ; QB
 2 R2n+4m+ , and refer to the
partition

MA;MB ;MAB ;M0
	
of the set M of public goods, where MA and
MB are the subsets of goods exclusively contributed by spouses A and B, re-
spectively,MAB is the subset of goods to which both spouses contribute andM0
is the subset of goods that are not consumed by the household at this equilib-
rium. Denote by mA, mB , mAB and m0 the cardinals of the respective subsets
in this partition.
The variables QA and QB can be ignored in the following, since they are
equal to the the sum gA + gB . Also, mA +mB + 2m0 variables characterizing
the equilibrium are trivially determined, namely gJk = 0 for k 2 M J [M0,
J = A;B. Thus, we are left with 2n + 2m    mA +mB + 2m0 unknowns.
There are 2 budget equations, 2 (n  1) equations expressing the rst order
conditions for the private goods,7 and mA +mB + 2mAB equations expressing
the rst order conditions for public goods. Hence, the number of unknowns is
equal to the number of equations, so that an equilibrium is (generically) locally
determinate.
Now, observe that the contributions to public consumption appear in the rst
order conditions only in the sums gAk + g
B
k as soon as there is full autonomy for
public good k: Ak = 
B
k = 1. Let M
 be the subset of MAB (with cardinal m)
for which this is the case. Then, the equation system reduced to the 2 (n  1)+
mA +mB +2mAB rst order conditions has only 2n+mA +mB +2mAB  m
unknowns, namely qJi (for J = A;B and i = 1; :::; n), g
J
k (for J = A;B and
k 2 MJ [  MABM) and gAk + gBk (for k 2 M). Hence, there is an excess
of the number of equations over the number of unknowns equal to m   2, so
that there is generically overdeterminacy if m > 2, or even if m = 2, since
the household consumption is entirely determined in this case by the sole rst
7We are assuming for simplicity that all the n private goods are consumed by both spouses
at the equilibrium we refer to.
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order conditions, independently of any budget constraint. Determinacy thus
implies either m = 0 or m = 1: there is at most one public good for which the
autonomy of the two spouses is full which is jointly contributed. If there is full
autonomy with respect to public good k, which is jointly contributed, we may
ignore the decomposition of Qk into gAk and g
B
k , and completely determine the
system by just adding the household budget equation. In other words, there is
local income pooling.
This analysis can be straightforwardly applied to the game with voluntary
contributions to public goods (where m = mAB). Generically, either mAB = 0
(separate spheres), with the two individual budget equations making the system
determinate, or mAB = 1 (separate spheres up to one public good), with local
income pooling, as shown by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2010).
3.2 Foundations of the spousesdemand functions
In order to pursue our local analysis, let us establish, for exogenous degrees of au-
tonomy, the foundations of the spousesdemand functions to be aggregated into
the household demand function. The Marshallian demand function of spouse
J 2 fA;Bg, conditional to a given choice g J 2 Rm+ of the other spouse, can be
straightforwardly derived from his/her utility maximization program:
xJ
 
p;PJ ;YJ ; g J  arg max
(qJ ;gJ )2Rn+m+
UJ
 
qJ ; gJ + g J

(24)
pqJ + PJgJ  YJ ,
with PJk  JkPk +

1  Jk

P Jk = Pk  

1  Jk

P Jk for k = 1; :::;m, and
YJ  Y J  Pk 1  JkP Jk g Jk , equal at a household -equilibrium to Y J  P
k

1  Jk

P Jk g
J
k .
We shall limit our local analysis to an open set 
  Rn+m+1+ of environment
values !  (p; P; Y ). We assume that the sharing rule  2 (0; 1), dened by 
Y A; Y B
   A; BY  (; 1  )Y , and the degrees of autonomy A; B 2
(0; 1)
2m of the two spouses are di¤erentiable functions of the environment, which
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are dened on 
. We further assume equilibrium uniqueness,8 as well as no
regime switching over 
: the private goods purchased by each spouse and the
public goods to which she/he actually contributes (corresponding to the non-
zero elements of equilibrium vectors
 
qA; gA

and
 
qB ; gB

) are the same for each
element of 
. This allows us to refer to di¤erentiable functions gJ : 
 ! Rm+
(J = A;B) associating with each environment value ! the equilibrium values
of the individual contributions gJ (!). Because of no regime switching, we may
admit without loss of generality (by simple redenition of the utility function)
that all private and public goods are consumed at equilibrium. We keep the
notation of the preceding Subsection: MJ and MAB for the sets of public
goods contributed by spouse J and by both spouses, respectively, mJ and mAB
for the corresponding cardinals (with mA +mB +mAB = m).
By di¤erentiability of the functions , J and gJ (implying that of the func-
tions P J with P Jk (!) = Pkg
J
k (!) =
 
gJk (!) + g
 J
k (!)

), we obtain from the
di¤erentiable Marshallian conditional demand functions xJ , as dened by (24),
di¤erentiable functions J : 
 ! Rn+m+ , depending directly upon the environ-
ment. We take their sum  = A + B as the household demand function.
3.3 The pseudo-Slutsky matrix of household demand at a
household -equilibrium
At any equilibrium, we can straightforwardly compute the pseudo-Slutsky ma-
trix 	 =

@(p;P )

+ [@Y ]

T
 
xA + xB

of the household demand function as
the sum of the two corresponding matrices	J =
h
@(p;P )
J
i
+
h
@Y 
J
i 
T
 
xA + xB

of the individual demand functions J , for J = A;B. By using the notationseP Jk = 1  JkP Jk , so that PJ = P   eP J and YJ = JY   eP JgJ , J h
@(p;P ) eP Ji + h@Y eP Ji T  xA + xB,  J  @(p;P )gJ + @Y gJ T  xA + xB
8Lechene and Preston (2010), studying the fully non-cooperative case, also rely on the
uniqueness assumption.
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and R =

@(p;P )

+ (@Y )

T
 
xA + xB

, we obtain:
	 =
Az }| {
@(p;P)xA

+

@YxA
 
TxA

+
Bz }| {
@(p;P)xB

+

@YxB
 
TxB

(25)
 
z }| { 
@YxA
  @YxB T  BxA   AxB  YR
+
z }| {0@ @gxA  @YxB h ePAi B+
@gx
B
  @YxA h ePBi A
1A
 
z }| {0@  @PxA+ @YxA T gAB+ 
@PxB

+

@YxB
 
T gB

A
1A.
The two matrices A and B are the Slutsky matrices of the individual
demand functions A and B . Their sum  has all the properties of a Slutsky
matrix. However, the pseudo-Slutsky matrix 	 di¤ers from  by a deviation
matrix  	 =    + , which is the sum of three matrices. The rst one,
, the only element of  	 in the fully cooperative case, is an outer product,
with rank no larger than 1, as shown by Browning and Chiappori (1998). It
expresses an aggregation e¤ect, working in the general case where there is no
representative consumer, independently of the existence of public goods. The
second matrix,  , expresses an externality e¤ect, working through the presence
of the contributions of spouse  J in the second argument of the utility function
of spouse J . This e¤ect appears in the fully non-cooperative case, in addition
to the aggregation e¤ect and has been analysed by Lechene and Preston (2010).
This externality e¤ect extends in our framework to the net income YJ because
of Lindahl taxation. The third matrix, , expresses the sum of the substitution
and income e¤ects of changes in the transformed personalized prices eP J . The
following proposition establishes the maximum rank of the deviation matrix
 	 at di¤erent regimes.
Proposition 3 At an equilibrium associated with an environment ! = (p; P; Y ),
the household demand function has a pseudo-Slutsky matrix 	 which deviates
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from a Slutsky matrix  = A + B: (i) under separate spheres, by a matrix
   of rank at most equal to
r  = m+min

n maxmA  mB ; 1	 ; 1	 ,
where mA  mB is assumed non-negative WLOG; (ii) under joint contribution
to mAB public goods, by a matrix    + of rank at most equal to
r + = m+ 3mAB +min

n maxmA  mB   1; 1 + 3mAB	 ; 1	 .
Proof. See Appendix.
3.4 Empirical testing
The upper bound imposed upon the rank of the deviation matrix can be used
to test the di¤erent models of household behavior. Browning and Chiappori
(1998) have used this upper bound to discriminate between the unitary model
(which predicts that the matrix 	   T	 has rank 0 because of the symmetry
of 	 = ) and the collective model (which predicts that 	   T	 has rank at
most 2, since 	 =  ,  having a rank at most equal to 1). They have also
shown that this test requires at least 5 goods, a requirement that stems from
the fact that the rank of 	  T	 cannot be higher than 2 if the number n+m
of goods is not larger than 4 (given the linear dependence of the columns of 	
introduced by the homogeneity of degree zero of the demand functions).
Lechene and Preston (2011) have shown that, in order to reject the non-
cooperative model, one must have n  m+ 5. Their Lemma A.1 shows indeed
that, if 	   T	 has rank at most n+m  1, then 	 can always be expressed
as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank not higher than r such
that 2r+1  n+m  1. For r = m+1, as in the non-cooperative case, the test
works only if 2 (m+ 1) + 1 < n+m  1, that is, if n > m+ 5.
As previously emphasized, there is no possibility of discriminating between
full and partial autonomy under separate spheres, since the non-cooperative and
the semi-cooperative models are then observationally equivalent. Discrimination
between the two models becomes possible under joint contribution to at least
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one public good. In the semi-cooperative case, if we apply Lechene and Preston
(2011) Lemma A.1 to the preceding Proposition, with r = m + 3mAB + 1,
we see that n > m + 2
 
3mAB + 2

is needed to discriminate between full and
partial autonomy.9 Moreover, as soon as there is joint contribution to more
than one public good,10 the non-cooperative model is generically excluded, and
full cooperation is still rejected at a rank of 	   T	 larger than 4, leaving the
possibility of semi-cooperation.
4 Conclusion
Our purpose in this paper has been to develop models of the household that do
not impose collective e¢ ciency, an assumption often contradicted by empirical
evidence,11 and that do not limit non-cooperation to the pure voluntary contri-
butions model, the consequences of which seem to be rather special (separate
spheres or separate spheres up to one public good). However collective e¢ ciency
and pure non-cooperative behavior are not excluded but included as particular
models in a more comprehensive approach trying to give account of the large
variety of formal and informal contractual arrangements and decision proce-
dures that are used by households all over the world. The concept of household
equilibrium is meant to be exible by allowing the household members to adopt
various degrees of autonomy, either determined endogenously as characteristics
of a specic equilibrium among many others, or taken as parameters preliminar-
ily and conventionally xed within the household and reecting some selection
process.
9 If, for instance, we are in the special case of only one public good to which both spouses
contribute, at least 12 private goods are required. The maximum possible rank of 	   T	,
given homogeneity of degree 0 of the demand functions, is then 12. As the observed rank
increases from 0 to 10, the test successively rejects the unitary model (at 2), full cooperation
(at 4), full autonomy (at 6) and the semi-cooperative model as a whole (at 12).
10 In a recent empirical application of the non-cooperative model to data drawn from the
Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011) could not
reject joint contributions to two or three public goods by some households.
11See, for example, Udry (1996).
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An important issue that is raised by these results is the identication of a
good consumed by the household as being private or public (or semi-public).
As we have seen, this is crucial for the testability of the various models.12 The
public or private nature of a good is of course linked to some objective charac-
terictics, like the possibility of being non-exclusively consumed or the presence
of external e¤ects, but also linked to the recognition of such characteristics by
the spouses themselves and their agreement to share the good. Another un-
solved related issue is the xing of the autonomy parameters. The techniques
used by the New Empirical Industrial Organization when estimating conduct
parameters could possibly be adapted.13Further work is obviously required.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
(Separate spheres) This is the simpler case, in which semi-cooperation
is observationally equivalent to non-cooperation. We rst show that  = 0.
For any h and h0, the generic element of A   @PxA+ @YxA T gAB ,
namely
P
k
 
@Pkx
A
h

+

@YxAh
 
T gAk

Bkh0 , is equal to zero under separate
spheres, since Bkh0 = 0 if k 2 MA, and
 
@Pkx
A
h

+

@YxAh
 
T gAk

= 0 if
k 2 MB (a variation in the price of a public good to which spouse A does not
contribute cannot induce changes in As demand for any good and gAk = 0 by
denition). The same argument holds for the second term B of the matrix
, so that  = 0. Also,
h eP Ji  J = Pk  Jk P Jk   Jk = 0, since P Jk = 0 if
k 2 M J , and   Jk = 0 if k 2 MJ , so that  =

@gx
A

 B +

@gx
B

 A. Each
matrix

@gx
J

has at most n + mJ non-zero rows, which however cannot be
linearly independent since [(p; P )]

@gx
J

= 0 (consumption changes induced by
the sole utility externality e¤ect should not modify the expenditure (p; P )  xJ ,
which has to be kept equal to Js income). Hence, the rank of

@gx
J

is at most
equal to n+mJ   1. As to the matrix  J , it has at most mJ non-zero rows, so
that the rank of the matrix  cannot be higher than
r = m+min

n  1   mA  mB ; 0	 .
As already stated, the rank of matrix  is at most equal to r = 1. Now,
by applying Eulers identity to the functions  and xJ , which are homoge-
neous of degree 0, we see that [(p; P )]

T	

= [(p; P )]

T

= 0, implying
[(p; P )]

T (  ) = 0, so that the columns of the matrix     are not lin-
early independent. Hence, the rank of this matrix is at most equal to n+m 1.
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Taking this upper bound into account and simply adding r and r, we ob-
tain the same result as Lechene and Preston (2010, theorem 3.3) for the fully
non-cooperative case:
r  = min

n+m  1; 1 +m+minn  1   mA  mB ; 0		
= m+min

n maxmA  mB ; 1	 ; 1	 .
(Joint contribution to public consumption) Under the regime of joint
contribution to mAB public goods, the column

@Pkx
J

+

@YxJ
 
T gJk

= 0 if
k 2M J , as in the regime of separate spheres. Thus, in the product of matrix
@PxJ

+

@YxJ
 
T gJ

with matrix  J the corresponding k-th line of the
latter might as well be zero. But  J has mJ further zero lines, namely any
j-th line such that j 2 MJ . Hence, the matrix product is upper bounded by
mAB and the rank of  (the sum of two such products) by r = 2mAB . As
to matrix , we can apply the argument developed for the regime of separate
spheres, only with an increase of mAB in the number of non-zero rows. We thus
obtain for its maximum rank:
r = min

min

n+mA +mAB   1;m	+ 1;mB +mAB	
+min

min

n+mB +mAB   1;m	+ 1;mA +mAB	
= m+mAB +min

n   mA  mB ; 0	 .
By taking again into account the homogeneity of degree zero of the demand
functions  and xJ , and adding the three maximum ranks r, r and r, we
obtain the maximum rank of the deviation matrix:
r + = min

n+m  1; 1 +m+ 3mAB +minn   mA  mB ; 0		
= m+min

n  1;minn   mA  mB ; 0	+ 3mAB + 1	
= m+ 3mAB +min

n maxmA  mB   1; 3mAB + 1	 ; 1	 .

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